1. Fast deal

1.1. Dividing Kosovo north-south

1.1.1. With peace-keeping troops
1.1.2. Without peace-keeping troops

Refugees can partly return, instability in region through hundreds of thousands across border and continuing Milosevic regime
Pressure on Montenegro  - possibly coup, internal problems with refugees – international community’s help most needed to rescue Montenegro

1.2. Preserving Kosovo, but for Serbs mainly, with Russian peacekeeping troops, technical impediments of refugee returns
Milosevic stays strong, needs to regain Montengro – coup imminent

1.3. Milosevic giving in fast, allowing ground troops into Kosovo
Unlikely, would weaken his grip, would make intervention in Montenegro more risky for him, chance for Montenegro, if it receives international guarantees

1.4. Internal coup against Milosevic
1.4.1. More radical
Not likely during NATO intervention, would lead to violence in Montenegro
1.4.2. More moderate leaders
Not likely as long as Milosevic is defender/saviour of Serb people and pride and Kosovo, would allow Montenegro to continue reforms

2. Continued bombing – 3-6 weeks total = ending mid-end April

2.1. With deal

2.1.1. Preserving Kosovo within Jugoslavia, without NATO troops
Would make Milosevic stronger still, international need for him as peacemaker, would continue to make troubles, but probably no coup now in Montenegro
2.1.2. Signing Rambouet – or substitute, with NATO troops
Would weaken Milosevic over the medium term, would probably encourage secessionists in Montenegro, but allow reforms to go on
2.1.3. Dividing Kosovo, with or without NATO, some troops
Would allow Milosevic to come out as defender of orthodox Serbs, but against whole world without chance, got the best he could, stirring new troubles in Serbia and Montenegro

2.2. Without deal

2.2.1. “stopping” offensive, after finished – Kosovo ends up pure Serbian, further stand-off with international community
the worst situation for both people in Serbia under totalitarian regime unchecked, for Montenegro – must fear coup/invasion imminent, for international community – lost, for region – all refugees
2.2.2. “invading” by NATO ground troops
General: the build-up of forces takes weeks, would allow Milosevic to clean up all internal enemies, including Montenegro; the prospect could then guide both sides in a bad deal for both sides, big risk for Montenegro during the build-up of forces
2.2.2.1. just in Kosovo
would leave Milosevic in power as defender of Serbia, would make VJ in Montenegro strategically important for fighting invasion and therefore require total control over Montenegro, that is coup or invasion
2.2.2.2. including Serbia/Belgrade – ousting of Milosevic
very unlikely and unacceptable to Russia, which could/would intervene, too high a risk for the West, not necessary for immediate goal of returning refugees, would allow Montenegro to declare independence with little fighting of its own, become ally of the West and get future development aid

[Remark: Scenarios 3 and 4 are variations within scenario 2, could be overlapping with 2.1 or 2.2]

3. Extension of War over the borders – during bombings

3.1. With Macedonia
Leads to immediate conflict with NATO troops there, would make invasion of Kosovo, possibly Serbia proper, imminent, see above, big risks during run-up phase of invasion

3.2. With Bosnia/RS
Would involve SFOR troops in fighting, including Russian SFOR contingents, and therefore present greatest danger for instability = best bet for Milosevic, would also make invasion of Serbia imminent, see above, big risks

3.3. With Albania
Would trigger massive response from NATO airtroops, make Montenegro strategically more important – destabilize Montenegro, possibly military coup there first, eventually make invasion imminent, if sustained battles with Albania

3.4. With Montenegro
Unlikely, as long as Montenegro makes no unilateral steps to independence or stops army from fighting; but likely if either of above is seen.
No need to invade it, since VJ is already there, but needs re-inforcements by VJ to fight Montenegrin police force, which is at least 20.000 strong; as long as there is no huge humanitarian desaster, NATO intervention as help to Montenegro is not assured, maybo not feasible; repression would then be directed against liberals, reformers and Albanian/Muslim population, foreigners

4. Coup in Montenegro during bombings

4.1. Controlled, no civil war
Meaning the army, VJ, moves fast to oust President Djukanovic and replace him by some Belgrade stooge, probably involving some killings, but then consolidating power fast; repression as in 3.4, increasingly likely as army command in MN has been purged already

4.2. With violence, resistance and civil war
If Djukanovic can keep Montenegrin police troops loyal and fend of the initial attack, AND if Serbia cannot spare enough troops to go into Montenegro to overwhelm resistance by sheer numbers, then there could be a protracted guerilla; likely with large-scale violence between pro/anti Serb factions, a government in exile and horrendous atrocities

4.2.1. NATO helps militarily
Likely only if some threshold of killings is passed AND if there is not yet a political solution/deal for Kosovo in sight
4.2.2. NATO can’t/won’t help

NATO can’t help anymore, if the VJ has consolidated power in Montenegro and intervention would require ground forces going into a totally hostile environment/ arena just like in Kosovo, then the military solution of Kosovo takes precedence

NATO won’t help, if it reaches a satisfactory deal over Kosovo first or at the same time with a coup/intervention in Montenegro – and NATO intervention would dirupt that deal; in that case, Montenegro would be the sacrifice